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[287] Europe is witnessing an ongoing debate amongst scholars, practitioners, 
and policy makers on the need for tort reform, especially with regard to the 
field of personal injury.1 Although the call for reform has not been voiced as 
distinctly as in the United States of America, there is a growing number of 
incidents that points towards a central question for European tort law scholars: 
is there any future left for tort law when it comes to compensating and pre-
venting death and personal injury?2 
Tort law is a set of rules, predominant in virtually all European legal systems, 
that has a number of concurring and sometimes diverging goals. In theory, tort 
law rules aim at preventing or discouraging specific unlawful behaviour that 
increases the risk of undesirable damage. At the same time the tort system is 
mainly focussed on compensating damage after the event. So, in effect, the 
general idea of the system is that by obliging the tortfeasor to compensate 
damages after the event, he is thus encouraged to act with the appropriate 
level of care before the event in order to prevent the event from happening.  
In the area of death and personal injury, this theoretical framework of tort law 
with its twofold objective3 is not always reflected by practice. The causes are 
manifold and closely related. In this short paper, I will present a collection of 
                                                 
1 Bill W. Dufwa himself has written extensively on this subject. See, e.g., Bill W. Dufwa, 
‘The Swedish Model of Personal Injury Compensation Law Reconsidered’, in: Ulrich Mag-
nus and Jaap Spier (ed.), European Tort Law - Liber Amicorum for Helmut Koziol, 2000, pp. 
109 ff. and Bill W. Dufwa, ‘Collectivization of Tort Law’, 48 Scandinavian Studies in Law 
(2003), pp. 51 ff. 
2 The list of publications on this topic is long. I will not try to provide a complete set of refer-
ences. See, e.g., with further references, P. Cane, Atiyah's Accidents, Compensation and the 
Law, 1999, Don Dewees, David Duff and Michael Trebilcock, Exploring the Domain of Acci-
dent Law - Taking the facts seriously, 1996, Jos Dute, Michael G. Faure and Helmut Koziol, 
No-Fault Compensation in the Health Care Sector, 2004, Jerry J. Phillips and Stephen Chip-
pendale, Who pays for car accidents? The Fault versus No-Fault Insurance Debate, 2002, 
Terence G. Ison, The forensic lottery, 1967, Stephen D. Sugarman, Doing Away With Per-
sonal Injury Law, 1989, P.S. Atiyah, The Damages Lottery, 1997, Donald Harris, Mavis Mac-
lean, Hazel Genn, Sally Lloyd-Bostock, Paul Fenn, Peter Corfield and Yvonne Brittan, Com-
pensation and Support for Illness and Injury, 1984. 
3 I will not address the question whether the tort system has any additional goals; please note 
that some authors argue that loss spreading is a social goal of tort law systems as well. 
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plausible [288] and proven causes and how they might be redressed.4 First, I 
will present a short overview of the causes that have been identified so far 
(paragraphs 2 and 3). Then, I will focus on possible alternatives for and ad-
justments to the current tort systems that could help to effectively achieve the 
twofold objective (paragraph 4). Finally, I will address the future research 
questions that, in my mind, should be on the agenda of European tort law 
scholars for the coming years (paragraph 5).5 
 
2. Aiming at prevention through the instrument of compensation; does it 
really work? 
 
In the field of personal injury, tort law practice is primarily focussed on com-
pensating victims after the event. The underlying principle of tort law, how-
ever, stresses that tort law also aims at providing precautionary incentives to 
potential tortfeasors before the event. This seems logical, because if compen-
sation of victims was the sole purpose of tort law there would be no point in 
linking compensation to a specific event for which someone else bears re-
sponsibility.6 If the focus was in fact exclusively on compensation, then surely 
a more rational distribution of scarce means would have to be considered.   
The twofold objective of tort law leads us to the question whether (and to 
what extent) tort law succeeds in either of these objectives. With regard to 
prevention it seems plausible to distinguish between repeat players and one 
shotters. The latter category mainly consists of private persons that either 
cause damage intentionally or negligently, or that bear the risk of a specific 
adverse event (e.g., strict liability for children, defective premises, animals). If 
personal injury follows from any of these events, most private persons have a 
personal liability insurance that covers the consequences.7 The ‘private tort-
feasor’ typically does not suffer financially from being held liable, which 
leads me to believe that in these cases the incentive effect, if any, is likely to 
be reduced.8 Consequently, it depends on the insurance companies’ policy 
(i.e., the use of, e.g., merit rating, deductibles, exclusions, et cetera) whether 
any of the financial incentives of tort law are in fact passed on to the tortfea-
sor.  
I expect that the picture would not change dramatically if liability insurance 
policies were unavailable for accidents caused by private individuals. If we 
consider traffic accidents, the typical domain of tort practice involving indi-
vidual tortfeasors, we would have to measure whether drivers would drive 
more carefully and the number of accidents would drop if there was no com-
prehensive car insurance. [289] Even though this lack of insurance coverage 
                                                 
4 The paper is restricted to the European legal systems, for the simple reason that other west-
ern legal systems (notably the United States tort system) have a number of features (e.g., 
punitive damages, remuneration for legal services, jury decisions, a dissimilar liability insur-
ance market) that render comparison in this respect quite difficult. 
5 The focus of attention is on the area of tortious liability for death and personal injury. 
6 Tort law should also be seen as a means of expressing responsibility, which in itself has a 
societal function. Cf., e.g., David Howarth, Three forms of responsibility: on the relationship 
between tort law and the welfare state, 60 Cambridge L.J. 2001, p. 572. 
7 Remember that tortfeasors in Europe do not carry the yoke of punitive damages. 
8 On moral hazard in insurance contracting, see, e.g., Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen, Law 
& Economics, 2000, p. 333. Note, again, that I am not referring to the American tort law 
system or to its liability insurance market. 
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would expose car owners to the full and uninsured liability burden (no doubt 
leaving a lot of victims without compensation), I still doubt that we would in 
fact experience such a drop in the number of accidents. Most traffic accidents 
happen as a result of incidental inadvertence or the human incapability to deal 
with unexpected road situations. These accidents are bound to happen and the 
slight chance that a driver can be held liable after an accident will presumably 
provide a weak incentive to that particular individual and an even weaker in-
centive to other road-users. Individual and incidental tortfeasors are not fully 
rational in adjusting their behaviour to the appropriate level of care, neither do 
they always have accurate information on the level of care actually required 
before the event. So, we could assume that these one-shotters are not being 
targeted with full effect by the tort incentive.9 In terms of accident avoidance, 
my guess is that the incentives provided by regulatory instruments such as 
criminal law sanctions combined with regular supervision are more effective 
in the domain of individual torts.10 
Admittedly, the cases of intentional wrongdoing by private individuals present 
a different picture altogether. Intentional torts are nearly always excluded 
from liability insurance coverage.11 Hence, in theory that exclusion would 
enhance the precautionary incentive of tort law. Nevertheless, we should not 
overestimate the incentive effect in this category of cases. Intentionally in-
flicted bodily harm is the métier of the drunk, the irresponsible, and the crimi-
nal. Therefore, it lies within the domain of criminal prosecution, and experi-
ence tells us that financial incentives – in terms of the threat of having to 
compensate – have a limited impact on this set of tortfeasors.12  
To conclude, I would speculate that tort law has little grasp on preventing 
either incidental negligence or intentional wrongdoing by private individuals. 
Instinctively, I would assume that the tort law incentive has more impact on 
the ‘corporate tortfeasor’: businesses and institutions that are being held liable 
for not preventing certain accidents. If a corporate tortfeasor is liable for a 
specific event, and this type of event is likely to happen repeatedly, then the 
likelihood increases that this tortfeasor or others in a comparable situation will 
prevent similar events from occurring in the future.13 Thus, we could assume 
that clear tort rules provide corporate tortfeasors with an incentive for prevent-
ing death and personal injury. Unfortunately, with regard to the European le-
gal systems there is no conclusive empirical evidence that underpins this as-
sumption. Obtaining such evidence would in fact be quite difficult, because 
the precautionary incentive seems to be distorted by the widespread availabil-
ity of corporate liability insurance. Liability insurance policies [290] still 
cover most of the personal injury cases involving repeat player corporate tort-
feasors. Therefore, the incentive effect could perhaps be measured best in the 
                                                 
9 Note, again, that I am not referring to the American tort law system or to its liability insur-
ance market. 
10 To my knowledge, there is no conclusive empirical evidence either supporting or attacking 
this assumption. 
11 On the exclusion of intentionally inflicted damage in insurance contracts, see Jürgen Base-
dow and Till Fock (ed.), Europäisches Versicherungsvertragsrecht, 2002, p. 101-102. 
12 Their being judgement proof has in fact prompted national legislatures to set up special 
state sponsored compensation funds for victims of criminal acts. See also Council Directive 
2004/80/EC of 29 April 2004 (Official Journal L 261) relating to compensation for crime 
victims. 
13 That is, unless this tortfeasor or group of tortfeasors is judgement proof. 
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areas where there is no insurability. Research would have to show whether a 
shift towards uninsurability prompts corporate tortfeasors to consciously move 
towards better risk management. However, no comprehensive research results 
on this issue are available.14 
 
3. Aiming at compensation through litigation and settlement; does it 
really work?  
 
Tort law gives the victim the right to be compensated in full, that is, not ac-
cording to need but according to the classical principle of restitutio in inte-
grum.15 Restoration in full, however, is a principle that is not always reflected 
in practice. If the victim succeeds in bringing together the evidence needed for 
a claim in tort, he still has to accept that he will usually not be compensated 
for the entire loss. Sometimes, very real types of damage are not compensated 
at all (e.g., in some jurisdictions, the losses of relatives of the injured person, 
or financial losses exceeding a fixed interest rate). Moreover, the time, effort 
and money spent on the process of claiming itself are hardly ever compen-
sated in full. This is in part due to the fact that most European legal systems 
provide weak or virtually no incentives for quick settlement of claims, thus 
potentially dragging the tort process on for years. The law of damages itself 
can sometimes be an obstacle in the way of swift settlement as well. For in-
stance, the calculation of loss of future earnings is usually postponed until the 
victim has reached a fairly stable condition which is expected to last. Until 
that moment, final settlement or compensation is impossible. 
A successful claim in part depends on the accessibility of the legal system. 
Research in some jurisdictions shows that accessibility is far from optimal. 
Victims experience difficulties in making themselves heard and a fair number 
of potentially successful claims are not being pursued at all.16 This could be a 
reason for concern because such a sub-optimal use of legal rights may also be 
causing a sub-optimal level of deterrence. What driving forces could be be-
hind this? No clear single cause can be identified, but research has revealed 
some possible explanations. First, it seems that this is in part a problem out-
side of tort law, and rather within the scope of the remuneration system for 
lawyers and the tariff structure of the legal services market. Although origi-
nally not a tort law problem, nevertheless these barriers are perceived to be the 
most bothersome in respect of personal injury claims simply because they 
withhold compensation from the individuals in society who need it the most: 
the injured and the bereaved dependent.  
Second, the existence of alternative compensation schemes such as social se-
curity, compulsory health insurance and widows’ pensions may relieve the 
most [291] pressing needs of the victim and may, to a certain extent, remove 
the need for claiming.  
                                                 
14 That is, with regard to European tort law. 
15 On that topic, see, e.g., U. Magnus (ed.) Unification of Tort Law: Damages, 2001 p. 188. 
16 See, e.g., Harris, Maclean, Genn, Lloyd-Bostock, Fenn, Corfield and Brittan,  Personal 
Injury Compensation: How Much is Enough? A study of the compensation experiences of 
victims of personal injury (Law Com. No 225), 1994, p. 52, and B. van  Velthoven and M. ter 
Voert, Geschilbeslechtingsdelta 2003, 2004. 
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Third, victims may not always have the relevant information with regard to 
their legal rights17 and if they do have this information they may be reluctant 
to pursue their claim because of the uncertainty that a court would in fact ac-
knowledge that a tort was committed. To quote the expression used by Atiyah: 
the tort process is somewhat of a lottery.18 Predicting who will win is prob-
lematic, as is predicting the amount in the jackpot: it is hard to predict whether 
a victim will in fact instigate a claim, and if he does whether he will succeed 
in the end in proving liability and obtaining full compensation. This element 
of chance may intimidate victims. 
 
4. Alternatives and Adjustments 
 
Tort is far from perfect. Although it aims both at preventing and compensat-
ing, there is little conclusive research into the effectiveness of tort law with 
regard to either objective. However, the available evidence so far suggests that 
tort law is performing badly in respect of both objectives. In my mind there is 
a simple explanation: in most jurisdictions, tort law is a product of a historical 
accumulation of rules, principles, and case law. Moreover, it is a system oper-
ated by lawyers with a great sense of respect for this body of law and with 
relatively little attention for the practical drawbacks and pitfalls that ‘the sys-
tem’ brings about. 
Does this mean that we should abolish tort law altogether? I do not think so. 
Before any well founded conclusion on abolition of tort law can be drawn we 
should thoroughly consider the facts. The truth is that we do not know all the 
relevant facts. In the previous paragraphs I have sought to identify at least one 
aspect of tort law, i.e. the deterrence of ‘repeat player corporate tortfeasors’ 
that deserves further empirical enquiries. My assumption was that tort law 
does deter so-called corporate tortfeasors to a certain degree, but we need em-
piricism to either falsify or confirm this and other assumptions. 
Then, we need to ask ourselves whether tort law should deter more than it 
does now. This is a highly current matter because private law remedies are 
increasingly thought of as alternatives for public control.19 Can tort law be a 
truly effective instrument of private enforcement? In theory the answer is af-
firmative. The tort system could be used for real ex ante prevention because 
most legal systems allow individuals, and, to a certain extent, interest groups 
to file injunction orders in order to actually prevent the risk from materialis-
ing.20 But it seems that in practice these instruments are hardly ever used – 
that is, in a consistent and persistent manner – for actually preventing a spe-
cific category of unlawful behaviour from [292] spreading. We need hard data 
that show causes,21 and then we can start debating possible adjustments.  
                                                 
17 For this reason I would advocate the extension of government ‘consumer education pro-
grams’ to personal injury law. 
18 Atiyah, supra note 2. 
19 See on that topic in respect of competition law, e.g., Clifford A. Jones, Private Antitrust 
Enforcement in Europe: A Policy Analysis and a Reality Check, 27 World Competition 2004, 
pp. 13 ff. 
20 The conditions for such injunctions, however, tend to be quite strict. Possibly, this is an 
impediment as well. 
21 Why are interest groups not keen on using injunction procedures? Do procedural rules im-
pede this use? Is the financial burden too heavy? Do the interest groups perceive their respon-
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Adopting an alternative for tort should be an ultimum remedium because al-
ternative schemes tend to compensate more people with smaller amounts per 
person, and alternative compensation schemes hardly ever invest in effective 
prevention of accidents. However, if a scheme can compensate to a fair degree 
and at the same time improve general prevention, then it should be considered 
for what it is: a serious alternative. In fact, the experience so far with alterna-
tive schemes has not always been promising from the compensation point of 
view,22 but admittedly some progress could be made with regard to more ef-
fective prevention of accidents in specific risk areas such as iatrogenic dam-
age.23 
Nevertheless I would prefer adjusting the existing system in order to enhance 
effectiveness. Surely, adjustments can be implemented if the case for political 
necessity is made out. What is fundamental for the success of these adjust-
ments is that no options are excluded and that accepted modifications are 
evaluated after some time. For instance, if strict liability is expected to com-
pensate more efficiently or fairly in a specific area without any expected 
change in deterrence, then a shift towards strict liability should at least be con-
sidered (and if implemented, then evaluated).  
Perhaps adjustments sometimes have to be unorthodox. For instance, a tort 
system could be combined with a public watchdog that is assigned the task of 
filing injunction claims against corporate tortfeasors. This may help monitor 
the implementation of court decisions and may prevent future corporate tor-
tious behaviour. Another example: perhaps tort claims for death and personal 
injury should be dealt with by specialized and/or centralized rather than re-
gionalized courts. It may even – when combined with procedural rules that 
would force barristers to actually cooperate with the court rather than procras-
tinate and frustrate swift proceedings – speed up the procedure and actually 
support settlement out of court. 
 
 
5. Future research questions 
 
The previous has been nothing more than a kaleidoscope of problems, their 
plausible causes and feasible solutions. The problems and their causes seem 
plausible, but in most cases they lack firm empirical evidence. In my opinion 
tort law research should focus more on obtaining this evidence. This would 
help fill the empirical gap in legal scholarship. It would also bring about fur-
ther research into the possible solutions to the actual deficiencies of tort law. 
The most far-reaching conclusion of this future research could be that Euro-
pean legal systems would have to make the [293] fundamental shift towards 
alternative compensation schemes such as no-fault compensation funds, com-
pulsory first party insurance et cetera. However, before announcing the death 
of tort we should first truly investigate whether the patient is in fact suffering 
                                                                                                                               
sibilities differently? Should the law be changed in order to facilitate this private enforce-
ment? Should we introduce some sort of system of punitive damages? 
22 See, e.g., M.G. Faure, in: Dute, Faure and Koziol, supra note 2, pp. 42 ff. 
23 This could at least be the case when no-fault compensation is combined with a strong 
safety-enhancing regulatory regime; on the possibilities of such a regime, see, e.g., Linda T. 
Kohn, Janet M. Corrigan and Molla S. Donaldson (ed.), To Err is Human - Building a Safer 
Health System, 2001. 
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from disease, what the nature of that disease is, and whether a cure can be 
expected from small doses of adjustments. Then we will have a clearer image 
of the future, if any, of tort law. 
 
